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WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO SAY 
THAT PROCEDURE IS POLITICAL? 
Dana Shocair Reda* 
INTRODUCTION 
An appointment to the committee that reviews and amends the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure is unlikely to earn you any friends these days.  The 
Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure (“the Advisory 
Committee” or “the Committee”) routinely finds itself at the center of 
controversy as it undertakes its mission to improve the rules that govern 
civil matters in our federal courts.1 
Attorneys and parties who often appear in federal court criticize not only 
the product of the Advisory Committee’s work but also the integrity of its 
members.  There is no shortage of commentary charging procedural reform 
with political maneuvering.  Scholars have documented the sociological 
makeup and political affiliation of the Advisory Committee;2 they have 
mapped industry lobbying on procedural matters3 in both Congress and 
with the Committee itself.  Many have argued that procedure has been a 
 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, Peking University School of Transnational Law.  I am 
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workshop and at the colloquium entitled Civil Litigation Ethics at a Time of Vanishing 
Trials, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics at 
Fordham University School of Law.  For an overview of the colloquium, see Judith Resnik, 
Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial:  Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto 
Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 
(2017).  I especially wish to thank Bruce Green for inviting me to participate in this 
colloquium.  Danielle Rapaccioli, Anna Schuler, and the editorial team at the Fordham Law 
Review provided excellent assistance, both technical and substantive, throughout.  I am 
indebted to Ray Campbell, Nicholas Frayn, Norman Ho, Doug Levine, Thomas Man, Aziz 
Rana, Judith Resnik, and Victor Quintanilla for their helpful comments and Zhu Liusheng 
for indispensable research assistance. 
 
 1. This is not to suggest that dissatisfaction and pressure on the rulemaking committees 
are new developments.  For accounts of mounting pressure four decades ago, see generally 
Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform:  A Call for a Moratorium, 59 
BROOK. L. REV. 841 (1993); Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme 
Court:  A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673 (1975). 
 2. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience:  Mandatory Informal 
Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795 (1991); Jeffrey Stempel, 
Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking:  Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 
619–21 (2001). 
 3. See generally Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell:  Contemporary Legends About 
the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998); Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in 
Disarray:  The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for 
Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994). 
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blunt political instrument,4 with rulemakers, courts, and Congress all 
engaging in civil procedure reform to achieve political ends through 
seemingly apolitical means.5 
Most recently, the discussion of procedure’s politics has centered on 
discovery reform, especially upon the reform efforts that culminated in the 
2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  One of the 
centerpieces of that reform process was the 2015 amendments’ adoption of 
“proportionality” as a key standard to lower costs and increase discovery 
efficiency.6  The proportionality amendment was among the most 
controversial amendments the Advisory Committee proposed.7 
 
 4. Commentary suggests that politicization makes for bad rulemaking and that 
increasing the political tenor of the rulemaking process will exacerbate existing difficulties. 
See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process:  Court Rulemaking, Democratic 
Legitimacy and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 923–94 (1999) (“Because 
of . . . collective action problems . . . legislative rulemaking is likely to be plagued by 
inefficient logrolling. . . .  [I]nefficient logrolling is less likely in a court-based rulemaking 
process which relies on a committee system.”); Burbank, supra note 1, at 849–50 (“[T]he 
more we fashion the rulemaking process in Congress’ image, the more Congress will be 
tempted to second-guess the product of that process or to preempt it.”); Paul D. Carrington, 
“Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 287; Brooke 
D. Coleman, Recovering Access:  Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil Rulemaking, 39 
N.M. L. REV. 261, 263 (2009); Mullenix, supra note 2, at 801 (“[O]pening the rulemaking 
process at the earliest stages of rule promulgation will politicize [it] as never 
before, . . . creat[ing] vacuous, ineffective rules that are the result of political 
compromise . . . [or] fail[ing] to effectuate any rule reform . . . .”). 
 5. The attention to the political role of procedure is not new.  Professor Burbank 
reminded us a decade ago that “procedure is power.” Stephen B. Burbank, Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context:  A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 
1442 (2008).  Indeed, he has been analyzing procedure’s relationship to power for much 
longer. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure and Power, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 513 
(1996) [hereinafter Burbank, Procedure and Power].  Professor Thomas Main has broken 
the claims about politics into two types.  The first set of claims argues that procedural reform 
is political because it affects outcomes. Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of 
Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801, 818–22 (2010).  The second set argues that 
procedure is politicized because of personnel attempting to change outcomes in line with 
their ideological commitments. See id. 
 6. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; see also 
Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition of the Federal Rulemaking 
Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1092 (2016). 
 7. See, e.g., Transcript of Proceedings, Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. on Civil 
Rules, Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (Feb. 7, 2014) [hereinafter February 2014 Hearing], http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/civil-rules-public-hearing-transcript-dallas-tx.pdf [https://perma.cc/4P3Y-
4KRQ]; Transcript of Proceedings, Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, 
Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Jan. 9, 
2014) [hereinafter January 2014 Hearing], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/civil-
rules-public-hearing-transcript-phoenix-az.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4H7-YRKF]; Transcript of 
Proceedings, Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Public Hearing on 
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Nov. 7, 2013) [hereinafter 
November 2013 Hearing], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/civil-rules-public-
hearing-transcript-washington-dc.pdf [https://perma.cc/25M3-NZKL].  Of the hundreds of 
written comments received specifically concerning the proportionality amendment, over 
two-thirds opposed the proposal. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LITIG., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON 
COMMENTS ON PROPOSED CHANGES TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 6 (2014), 
http://www.cclfirm.com/files/Report_050914.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3AY-G7AX]. 
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Perhaps because of the highly politicized context of discovery reform, the 
Advisory Committee has tended to engage in what it hopes will be 
objective or empirical criteria.  The concept of proportionality took center 
stage as an objective criterion and as a means of furthering another 
objective aim:  “efficiency.”  Unfortunately for the Advisory Committee, 
this retreat into the appearance of objectivity did not silence the critics, 
likely because the concepts deployed in analyzing efficiency are neither 
objective nor coherent.  A century ago, in a different doctrinal context, 
Robert Hale helped to expose the limits of judicial objectivity.  This Article 
presents Professor Hale’s analytical critique as a helpful model for how to 
think about judicial branch rulemaking when political judgment is 
inescapable.  In part, this Article is motivated by a desire to further the 
scholarly assessment of procedure’s political role, while turning away from 
the assessment of individual ideological commitments and material interests 
of constituent parties.8 
Procedure is not the first field of law to face controversy along these 
lines.  Law’s independence from politics, in both its descriptive and 
normative aspects, is a century-long legal challenge.9  This Article aims to 
clarify what we mean when we characterize procedure as political, as well 
as to understand some of the harms generated by failing to confront and 
acknowledge the political.  This is a preliminary step in approaching future 
formulations of procedural rules if they cannot be depoliticized. 
I.  THE CURRENT APPROACH 
The civil rulemaking process has long been the subject of controversy, 
one reflective of inherent tensions in its obligation to reform procedure 
without altering substantive rights.  The legitimacy of the process relies on 
a premise that rulemaking and reform is a technical matter not requiring the 
exercise of political judgment.  In hopes of presenting objective and neutral 
discovery reform, the Committee focused in its 2015 amendment to Rule 26 
on the concept of “proportional” discovery. 
A.  The Rulemakers’ Predicament 
The civil rulemaking process has been the subject of controversy for at 
least the last thirty years.  No matter what proposal the rulemakers develop, 
they face scrutiny, criticism, and at times, outright disdain.  Some scholars 
have proposed that the procedural rulemaking process be returned to the 
legislature, while various other proposals have been made to cure the 
 
 8. Scholars have done important work to explore the sociology of procedural 
rulemaking, as well as to map the strategies and methods of industries to further their 
material interests through procedure.  Without diminishing the significance of those insights, 
this Article aims to shift the focus of the inquiry in hopes that new details of the field 
become clear. 
 9. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960, at 
9–31 (1992). 
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perceived failings of the Rules Enabling Act process.10  In addition to 
attacks on the efficacy of the civil rulemaking process, scholars and 
practitioners have also raised questions as to the Advisory Committee’s 
objectivity.  Some suggest that the Advisory Committee is biased toward 
defendants,11 others suggest that the bias is toward moneyed interests, still 
others argue the Committee is comprised of too many Republican-
appointed judges, and some even suggest the problem is too many judges of 
any stripe.12  From some, the criticism is of the very openness and 
transparency of the process, in that the openness has politicized the 
development of the substance.13 
All this criticism points not just to the controversy and political 
investment in our procedural rules but also to the peculiar position in which 
the rulemakers, and particularly the Advisory Committee as the originator 
of proposed amendments, find themselves.  The Advisory Committee is 
charged with a nearly impossible task.  It is a body housed within the 
judicial branch that has been delegated legislative authority to promulgate 
transsubstantive rules governing all substantive legal areas that might be the 
subject of suit in the federal courts.  Those rules must not expand or 
contract any substantive right.  Yet the Advisory Committee process, as 
delineated by Congress, makes it look more analogous to an administrative 
body, ordinarily charged with implementing policy determinations.  The 
Committee must conduct meetings open to the public and provide advance 
notice for those meetings, the meeting minutes must be made publicly 
available, a written report must be submitted detailing what the Committee 
considered in its deliberations, public hearings must be held, and a period is 
opened for public comment.14 
Aside from the tension inherent in the Committee’s process and structure, 
there is also the contradiction inherent in its procedural purview.  The 
rulemakers must restrict themselves to procedural as opposed to substantive 
 
 10. See, e.g., Burbank, Procedure and Power, supra note 5, at 513 (calling for attention 
to practitioner’s participation and to empirical data); Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil 
Procedure Rulemaking:  Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 615 (2010) (calling 
for more congressional involvement in the civil rulemaking process); Coleman, supra note 4, 
at 292–96 (proposing a set of structural changes to committee rulemaking to recenter access 
in federal rulemaking); Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found:  Redefining 
the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1171 (1996) 
(proposing review of rulemaking activity by interbranch commission); Thomas E. Willging, 
Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in Civil Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1121, 1126 (2002) (advising the Standing and Advisory Committees to seek 
congressional permission to adopt experimental rules to test the possible impact of a 
proposed Rule or amendment).  But see Bone, supra note 4, at 887 (defending the civil 
rulemaking process). 
 11. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 2, at 623–34. 
 12. See, e.g., Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 229, 248 (1998).  But see Bone, supra note 4, at 926 (arguing for more judicial 
involvement in rulemaking). 
 13. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 4, at 909 (arguing that the rulemaking process requires 
deliberation, not public participation). 
 14. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IV, 102 
Stat. 4642, 4648–52 (1988); see also Bone, supra note 4, at 903. 
2017] IS PROCEDURE POLITICAL? 2207 
law.  This difficulty, if not impossibility, of parsing such a line between 
substance and procedure has been addressed many times by other 
scholars.15  These two features of civil rulemaking—a commitment to 
transsubstantivity on the one hand and strictly procedural effects on the 
other—point to a core challenge of the rulemakers’ work.16 
The vision of the rules as procedural and not substantive and their formal 
application across cases, without regard to the substantive (or political) 
implications of those cases, is central to the existence of the Advisory 
Committee.  The Committee is saddled with the burden of holding itself out 
as a body whose decisions are apolitical.  Indeed, the Committee’s 
existence relies on the premise that it can engage in a largely expert and 
technical task best left to the judiciary rather than the political branches.  To 
the extent that its decisions are understood to be political rather than 
“procedural,”17 the legitimacy of its actions is called into question. 
Yet, the political implications of Committee action are made clear by the 
uproar that its proposals engender and the criticism it has faced as to its 
substantive determinations, process, and structure.18  Indeed, Committee 
members themselves have acknowledged that reality.19 
  
 
 15. See, e.g., Burbank, Procedure and Power, supra note 5, at 513; Robert M. Cover, 
For James Wm. Moore:  Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 732 
(1975); Main, supra note 5, at 801; David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Process of 
American Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1191, 1191 (defending transsubstantivity against its 
procedural critics as a “principle of doctrinal design” as a useful remedy for failings of 
institutions that generate procedure); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and 
Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1027 (2013). 
 16. Many have called the wisdom of this commitment into question, and the extent to 
which the present structure achieves transsubstantivity has been challenged, but, at least in 
theory, transsubstantive procedure persists. See Marcus, supra note 15, at 1201–07. 
 17. I put this term in quotation marks, as it here stands for nonpolitical.  The very 
political impact of procedure has been long recognized, even in such adages as, “I’ll let you 
write the substance on a statute and you let me write the procedure, and I’ll screw you every 
time.” Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 875, 889 n.57 
(2011) (quoting Regulatory Reform Act:  Hearing on H.R. 2327 Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 
(1983) (testimony of Rep. John D. Dingell)). 
 18. See Danya Shocair Reda, How the Anchoring Effect Might Have Saved the Civil 
Rule-Makers Time, Money, and Face, 34 REV. LITIG. 751, 759–64 (2015). 
 19. In a subsequent discussion on pleading, a committee member asked: 
whether it is possible to determine whether any heightened rate of dismissals is a 
good thing or bad [and] agreed that it is important to gather data.  “But in the end, 
it will be a policy decision.”  It was agreed that this is a good caution to observe.  
It is distinctively difficult for the rules committees to make policy decisions in a 
way that is not political, or seen to be political. 
Draft Minutes:  Civil Rules Advisory Committee March 18–19, 2010, in 1 COMMITTEE ON 
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE JUNE 2010 AGENDA BOOK 147, 158 (2010), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/15334/download [https://perma.cc/D7TR-2KK5]. 
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B.  The Quest for an Objective Discovery Standard 
It is thus not surprising that, in developing the 2015 amendments, the 
Advisory Committee was searching for a neutral and technical measure of 
how much discovery the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should allow.  
The “proportionality standard” aimed to serve this function. 
The 2015 amendments were animated by ongoing concerns over the cost 
and delay of discovery.20  The Committee recognized that it had long been 
concerned with discovery cost and burden but that the problem had not 
been resolved.  Specifically, the Committee pointed to the 1983 amendment 
to Rule 26, aimed primarily at minimizing discovery abuse.21  But this 
change, the Advisory Committee explained, “cannot be said to have 
realized the hopes of its authors.”22  The 1983 amendment created a 
limitation on otherwise permissible discovery if it was unduly burdensome 
and included cost-benefit language in the Rule to guide the inquiry.23  Since 
the 1983 language had not succeeded in eliminating complaints about 
burdensome discovery, the Committee resolved to move the cost-benefit 
language, what it called the “proportionality” standard, up from the 
limitation clause of Rule 26(b)(2) into the definition of the “general scope 
of discovery” laid out in Rule 26(b)(1).24 
 
 20. It is true that there has been persistent, vociferous accusations that the civil system 
generally, and discovery in particular, are “broken” and that cost and delay are both grievous 
and rising.  For an analysis of the law of empirical foundation for these claims and a 
discussion of why they nonetheless persist, see generally Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-
and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform:  Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 
1085 (2012).  This interpretation of the 1983 revisions has been challenged from several 
corners. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 6, at 1116 (“Proportionality has never defined the 
general scope of discovery, and the statement that the amendments will simply ‘restore’ 
proportionality to its former place is disingenuous.”); January 2014 Hearing, supra note 7, at 
39 (statement of Arthur R. Miller) (suggesting the 2015 amendments posed a significant 
change to the original design of Rule 26(b)(2)(c), “when you put something in as sort of a 
discount or safety valve on relevance, that is quite different than pushing it as an adjunct, a 
correlative, a coequal with relevance”). 
 21. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. 
 22. Memorandum Regarding the Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules from 
David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Jeffrey S. 
Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 10 (May 8, 2013) 
[Report of the Advisory on Civil Rules], http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesandPolicies/rules/Reports/cv05-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/AGR7-HTAF]. 
 23. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. 
 24. Federal Rule 26(b)(1) defines the scope of permissible discovery. See id. 26(b)(1).  
To the prior language setting out that parties may obtain discovery regarding “any non-
privileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” the 2015 amendments 
added the following proportionality requirement:   
and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues 
at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to 
relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in 
resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit.  
Id.  These factors were taken, with slight modifications, from Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(3), a 
provision that earlier had specified circumstances in which limitations on allowable 
discovery were necessary. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
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This revision altered the definition of “discoverable information” itself.  
Prior to the 2015 amendment, information needed to be relevant and 
nonprivileged.25  The amendment now requires information to be relevant, 
nonprivileged, and proportional to the reasonable needs of the case.26  This 
final proportionality requirement would come to be defined by a six-factor 
analysis, bringing the total number of criteria required to assess 
discoverability to eight. 
Initially, the Committee contemplated simply adding the term 
“proportional” to Rule 26(b)(1).27  Some members worried, however, that 
the “[a]ddition of this term without definition . . . would be too open-ended 
to support uniform or even meaningful implementation.”28  They 
considered the term “reasonably proportional” but were still not convinced 
that this addition would generate sufficient clarity.29  To resolve this 
uncertainty the Committee turned to the cost-benefit factors laid out in Rule 
26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
The Committee intended to provide some rigor to the proportionality 
concept by importing a five-factor standard.30  But, despite their efforts, the 
standard remained unclear.  When practitioners were provided a draft of the 
revision, they had a hard time agreeing on its most basic contours.  All 
understood the Committee wanted discovery to be proportional, but 
proportional to what exactly?  The concept remained open to multiple 
interpretations. 
Consider this discussion at a “miniconference” the Committee hosted to 
get early practitioner feedback on possible amendments.  An employment 
lawyer expressed his view that the proportionality standard would be a 
problem for a poorly resourced discrimination plaintiff because “[t]he 
defendant will always argue that the cost of discovery is more important 
than the relatively low stake in dollars.”31  For example, if an employee’s 
claim is only worth $50,000, allowing discovery that costs just as much 
would be disproportionate. 
In response to the employment lawyer’s concerns, an attorney in a 
corporate counsel position reassured him that the comparison is not 
between discovery cost and the value of the claim.32  Rather, “[t]he 
question is the value of the discovery in proving the 
claim. . . .  Proportionality bears on the quality of the evidence in the 
 
 25. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, supra note 22, at 10. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. This would eventually become the six-factor standard present in the finalized 2015 
amendment. 
 31. Duke Conference Subcommittee:  Miniconference Notes, 8 October 2012, in 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES NOVEMBER 2012 AGENDA BOOK 309, 328 (2012) 
[hereinafter Duke Conference Subcommittee], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ 
fr_import/CV2012-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/JHV5-DV47]. 
 32. Id. 
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case.”33  These represent two different readings of the content of 
proportionality.  Specifically, it is important to understand what is being 
demanded of discovery.  The employment lawyer interpreted the standard 
to require that the cost of discovery be proportional to the total value of the 
claim.  The corporate counsel believed it must instead require that the cost 
of discovery be proportional to the probative value of the discovery.  Both 
are plausible readings of the proportionality standard, and one can easily 
imagine that the proportionality determination might yield different 
outcomes depending on which factors are compared.34 
The employment lawyer raised a second set of concerns that addressed a 
standard based on an assessment of the value of discovery in proving a 
claim.  Employment discrimination cases, he explained, are rarely proved 
through a “smoking gun” document.35  Thus, access to the defendant’s files 
was necessary if the plaintiff, even in a strong case, was to have any 
possibility of countering the defendant’s explanation for its adverse action.  
So how will the value of the case as a whole or of any particular request be 
assessed?  After listening to participants’ observations, one Committee 
member intervened to ask:  Is “‘proportional to the reasonable needs of the 
case’ . . . an attempt to quantify things that cannot be quantified?  Is it 
simply not understandable?”36 
After publication, in public comments and hearing testimony, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys raised concerns that incorporating proportionality into the scope 
of discovery would leave them fighting to get necessary discovery.37  
Plaintiffs’ attorneys argued that if information only falls within the scope of 
discovery when it is proportional, defendants will refuse to produce 
discovery on the grounds that it is disproportionate.38  Moreover, judges 
will not be well placed to evaluate defendants’ proportionality claims.  
Even where the court ultimately orders the discovery, having to fight for 
that discovery will increase cost and delay.  All this, plaintiffs’ counsel 
argued, was to say nothing of the newly generated uncertainty as to what 
discovery will be allowed.39  Yet, the Committee’s amendment efforts 
remained committed to the utility of proportionality.  Committee members 
continued to assert the objective character of proportionality in the face of 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. That practitioners would have different interpretations of the standard is not 
surprising, as the committee members appear to have differed as well.  One judge described 
how he ensures proportionality by starting with the parties’ estimates of the stakes involved 
in the case and creating a discovery plan from there, thus, we can assume, seeking to keep 
discovery proportional to the stakes of the case.  2010 Conference Subcommittee Meeting:  4 
March 2011, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES APRIL 2011 AGENDA BOOK 276, 
278 (2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV2011-04.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/8FM7-5PM3]. 
 35. Duke Conference Subcommittee, supra note 31, at 328. 
 36. Id. at 329. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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attorneys’ repeated examples to the contrary in the public comment 
process.40 
The fissure between the Committee’s conceptualization of appropriate 
discovery as objective and measurable and litigants’ description of 
discovery as contextually dependent was a recurring theme of the public 
hearing testimony.  Repeatedly, Committee members expressed confusion 
as to why their proposed revision to the scope of discovery would make any 
difference in whether a plaintiff could obtain the discovery needed for 
proving his claim.  The Committee’s reasoning here seemed to be that the 
rule change was only aimed at prohibiting “disproportionate” discovery, 
which it seems they understood to be synonymous with “unnecessary” 
discovery.  As a result, any time an attorney expressed concern that he 
would not be able to obtain necessary discovery under the revised Rule, the 
Committee would respond by rejecting that possibility.41 
Indeed, Committee members even expressed skepticism of an attorney 
whose caseload generally puts him in the position of discovery producer.  
This attorney shared his belief that the Rule will greatly strengthen his 
capacity to resist discovery, slow the process down, and impose costs on his 
adversary.  He explained how, as an attorney representing defendants, he 
would interpret the proportionality requirement: 
[T]here was a question about would I raise proportionality as a defendant 
in the cases.  Absolutely, I would raise it, and here’s how I would do it.  I 
would not just object.  I would unilaterally withhold relevant documents 
 
 40. Patricia Moore describes Committee responses as thus:  “[T]hroughout the three 
days of public hearings, Committee members repeatedly evinced disbelief that any federal 
judge would ever be anything but reasonable, and steadfastly refused to recognize that any 
shift in the rules would shift the parties’ negotiating power.” Moore, supra note 6, at 1143.  
The proportionality factors, similar to the presumptive limits proposals discussed in “How 
the Anchoring Effect Might Have Saved the Civil Rule-Makers Time, Money, and Face,” 
also overestimate the capacities of the judge to “know” the objectively “right amount” of 
discovery based on relatively limited information. See Reda, supra note 18, at 751.  With 
both proposals, committee members repeatedly asserted confidence in judges’ ordering any 
“necessary” discovery. See, e.g., November 2013 Hearing, supra note 7, at 187 (“[I]t seems 
to me that a limit of five depositions is a disaster only if you can’t get more when you need 
more, and to say that a presumptive limit is a disaster necessarily implies that judges won’t 
exceed it in cases where it should be exceeded.” (emphasis added)). 
 41. The public hearing transcripts are littered with such responses. See, e.g., January 
2014 Hearing, supra note 7, at 279 (“[I]t’s not clear to me how then if the judge is faithfully 
following the rules and following proportionality, the result of putting it in the first sentence 
would change anything . . . .”); id. at 281–82 (“I don’t see how there would be a different 
result to your circumstance . . . .  Frankly, I think that’s part of the problem with some of 
the . . . Queen-For-a-day issues that we’ve been hearing. . . .  I don’t see it being a different 
outcome.”); id. at 23–25 (“[Y]ou said that under the proposal, judges would treat the amount 
in controversy as the primary factor. . . .  [O]ne would think that judges would appreciate 
that there are cases where there are factors that have to be taken into account that in an 
individual case are more important than amount in controversy. . . .  Why do you think 
judges will begin to interpret that differently?”); November 2013 Hearing, supra note 7, at 
181 (“I don’t understand why putting the factors into the scope of discovery would change 
the actual practice . . . .”); id. at 276 (“How would the Vioxx case have been any different 
under the proposed rules? . . .  The judge controlled the case by using the standards in 
26(b)(2)(C), which now under the proposal would be part of the first sentence in the scope of 
discovery.  The judge would still have to do the same thing.”). 
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based on my client’s subjective evaluation of whether the documents are 
proportional to the kind of case we’re in.42 
A Committee member asked in response:  “So the assumption in your 
conclusion is that a judge would allow you to get away with that?”43  The 
attorney confirmed that he did believe he would get away with it, not under 
the then-current Rule but under the proposed Rule:  “[Under this Rule,] I 
have a good faith belief that this is what is proportional to this, and that we 
don’t need to get into expensive or far-reaching discovery. . . .  It has given 
me control over what gets produced.”44 
The defense attorney provided details as to why it would be easy for him 
to assert that requests were not proportional by pointing out the inherent 
uncertainty in the valuations required by proportionality: 
 Now, that works great for me in patent cases, because patent cases, in 
my experience, are unique in that you have early on such diametrically 
opposed evaluations of the case. 
 It’s not unusual for the plaintiff to think they have got a several million 
or tens of millions [of] dollars case, and my client is looking [and] 
saying . . . it looks like we only owe 20 or $30,000. 
 I get to use that standard under this rule and say, okay, here’s a product 
data sheet, that’s all that you get.45 
A clear articulation of this disjuncture comes on the issue of Rule 26(g) 
certification.  Committee members appeared to feel strongly that the 
existing certification requirement for discovery requests is not unreasonable 
or unduly burdensome under Rule 26(g) and indicates that discovery 
requesters have always carried a burden of proportionality.  This did not 
resonate for previous commenters.  As one remark exemplary of the 
requester position put it:  “[W]e make certifications based upon what our 
knowledge is.  We don’t know what the other side’s burden is.  They make 
certifications based upon what their knowledge is.  They may have a very 
different idea about what is overly burdensome for them.”46  For plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, it is one thing to certify that they are making appropriate, not 
unreasonable requests, but it is another for the Rule to demand that the 
request must be both relevant and proportional before a party is entitled to 
production.  That this different demand would change the negotiating 
posture of the parties seems self-evident to discovery requesters. 
Discovery is already subject to a problem of information asymmetry that 
affects parties’ assessments of the proportionality of a request.  This 
problem can be alleviated through the sharing of specific information 
concerning storage systems, search criteria, and the like.  The above 
attorney’s statement, however, contains a second recognition.  Even 
complete transparency is not likely to lead to identical analyses, because the 
 
 42. February 2014 Hearing, supra note 7, at 157. 
 43. Id. at 161. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 157–58. 
 46. January 2014 Hearing, supra note 7, at 291. 
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terms at issue such as “undue burden” or “proportional” are not knowable, 
objective facts in the world but rather judgments influenced by the goals 
and needs of a particular party or class of parties and a vision of the ideal 
purpose and functioning of the law.47 
How can we understand the rulemakers’ commitment to the 
proportionality framework in the face of the extensive controversy it 
generated?  To do so, we must recognize the centrality of “efficiency” to the 
ongoing reform of civil procedure.  The “efficiency norm”48 is referenced 
explicitly in the drive to make changes to the discovery rules that 
culminated in the 2015 amendments.  The Committee Chair, Judge David 
Campbell, explained that these revisions were “designed to curtail the 
discovery process and make it more efficient [and] . . . [d]esigned to 
streamline the discovery process and reduce the expenses complained about 
at the Duke Conference.”49 
The rulemakers spent little, if any, time considering what they meant by a 
“more efficient” discovery process, and Professor Brooke Coleman shows 
that most often the Committee means nothing more than “inexpensive.”50  
When conceived of as merely “least expensive,” the efficiency goal sounds 
like a simple effort to meet the mandate of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 1 for “speedy and inexpensive” determination of every case.51  
Moreover, efficiency feels neutral and objective; surely no one is for 
inefficient procedure.  Neutrality and objectivity are appealing traits for 
rulemakers who reside outside the political branches and who are prohibited 
from rule reforms with substantive repercussions. 
Efficiency concerns have taken a particular form in the discovery 
context.  First, efficiency advocates claim that there is simply “too much” 
discovery.  Accordingly, the larger the volume of the discovery, the more 
money is spent on it (identifying it, reviewing it, producing it, and resisting 
 
 47. In a thoroughgoing economic assessment of the proportionality standard, Jonah 
Gelbach and Bruce Kobayashi outline just how challenging a proportionality assessment will 
be and how many of the elements will require a normative judgment when implementing the 
proportionality elements. See generally Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law 
and Economics of Proportionality in Discovery (Univ. Pa. Faculty Scholarship No. 1521, 
2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2551520 [https://perma.cc/GE 
J3-BXBP].  Among the factors they cover are the agency costs that arise when the discovery 
responder has superior information about its own costs of production or superior information 
about the strategic value of the production to each party. See id. at 3.  Even when objective 
factors are measurable, the ultimate determination of proportionality will require a normative 
assessment. See id. at 13. 
 48. I borrow this term from Professor Brooke Coleman. See Brooke Coleman, The 
Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777 (2015).  She provides deft analysis of this 
commitment to the concept of efficiency and the lack of clarity as to what it means. Id. at 
1786–95. 
 49. Draft Minutes:  June 11–12, 2012, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 
NOVEMBER 2012 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 31, at 69, 105.  One may reasonably question 
whether this is an accurate account of what occurred at Duke.  Presentations at the 
Conference itself indicated consensus on the topic of improving cooperation among 
attorneys, setting firm trial dates, and greater judicial involvement. 
 50. Coleman, supra note 48, at 1779–85. 
 51. Id. 
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its production).  Second, the availability of voluminous discovery in the 
system is understood to have a distorting effect on case outcomes, whether 
or not a lot of discovery is taken.52  Third, expenditures on discovery are 
considered an inefficient allocation of business resources and, as such, are 
understood to serve as a drag on the nation’s economy. 
It appeared to the Advisory Committee that a more efficient discovery 
system would better ferret out nonproportional discovery.  Stated another 
way, because all discovery must be proportional, the scope of discovery 
should only encompass relevant, nonprivileged information that is 
proportional.  Once again, this feels neutral and objective, for who would 
argue for disproportionate discovery?  Thus efficiency, given life through 
the Rule’s language of proportionality, took center stage in the 2015 
amendments.53 
Absent from the discussions was a recognition that the question of 
“efficient discovery” is subject to multiple meanings.  For instance, we 
might determine that an efficient discovery regime is one that produces all 
information relevant to the legal claims in a case as quickly as possible.  If 
our focus is on both speed and information sharing, we might calibrate the 
discovery process to penalize stonewalling and limit party discretion as to 
timeline and compliance with deadlines.  We might prioritize court 
resources and deem a discovery regime efficient where it produces relevant 
information with the least imposition on court time and attention.  
Alternatively, we might understand efficient discovery to be one that 
provides information to the party who is lacking information about the case 
in a manner that limits that party’s costs.  In other words, we might 
prioritize reducing the costs of asserting a claim. 
Our understanding of efficient discovery might take yet a fourth form and 
focus on the cost to a party of producing discovery.  Under this meaning, 
we would revise discovery rules to lower production costs.  This might lead 
us to limit the amount of discovery that is produced or shift costs from the 
producer to the requester.  This appears to be the meaning of “efficient 
discovery” with which the Committee was working, though it obviously 
does not make this explicit, since it does not recognize that the term is open 
to multiple interpretations. 
 
 52. This is believed to be true even when the amount of discovery taken in a given case 
does not prove to be large, because the threat of discovery expense will nonetheless alter the 
settlement outcome. 
 53. Professor Coleman demonstrates how rulemakers have made use of the efficiency 
concept while ignoring its conventional meaning in economic analysis.  She does so while 
leaving to the side what she flags as extensive critiques of even this, more sophisticated, 
efficiency concept.  Those critiques of efficiency make clear that, not unlike the concept of 
value, efficiency is a concept lacking a single, stable meaning, the content of which is 
frequently determined by the priors of the analyst deploying it. See generally Duncan 
Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems:  A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 
(1981); Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980). 
2017] IS PROCEDURE POLITICAL? 2215 
II.  PROFESSOR HALE AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 
IN JUDICIAL REASONING 
Judicial interest in finding objective criteria upon which to base legal 
determinations is not new.  Others have previously attempted to anchor 
controversial policy determinations in neutral concepts.  In the early 
twentieth century, Robert Hale examined how the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
search for objective value in rate regulation functioned to conceal the 
political judgments involved. 
A.  Professor Hale’s Context 
The Advisory Committee is not the first judicial body to attempt to 
anchor controversial policy determinations in neutral and objective 
concepts.  In the early twentieth century, economist and legal scholar 
Robert Hale was drawn into debates about rate regulation that centered on 
judges’ supposedly objective and neutral determination of value in judicial 
opinions.  Although the field is substantively remote from our focus here, 
the rules governing discovery and the reasoning that rulemakers use to 
assess their validity and the analysis developed by Professor Hale and his 
peers can nonetheless assist us in seeing the debate about discovery anew. 
Today, rate regulation of public utilities appears as an arcane doctrinal 
interest, but at the turn of the twentieth century, it sat on a major political 
fault line and was a core concern of economists and legal scholars.  The 
issue arose as a result of a series of laws passed in the late nineteenth 
century regulating rates of railroads and grain elevators.  In quick 
succession, states all over the nation established railroad commissions 
regulating rates, thus instituting a patchwork of local regulation of a 
national railway system.  The legality of rate regulation carried meaningful 
import both politically and intellectually.  Not only were the industries 
regulated among the most powerful economic actors in the nation, but the 
issue presented—the appropriate role of government in controlling 
businesses—also carried broad political implications.54 
Needless to say, this regulation generated a vociferous response from the 
business interests arguing for a laissez-faire economic and legal system.  In 
response, a set of progressive scholars developed theories that challenged 
the legal framework supporting economic laissez-faire policies.  Professor 
Hale’s professional work made significant contributions to a broad 
progressive attack on the intellectual foundations for laissez-faire policy. 
Two distinct aspects of Professor Hale’s analysis are of interest for our 
purposes.  First, his scholarship reconceptualizing “coercion” is beneficial 
and helps to reemphasize the bargaining context that procedural rules serve 
to structure.  Although bargaining through litigation is a fairly visible 
 
 54. Barbara Fried describes the then-common view of the stakes as:  “[T]he fight over 
public utilities regulation was a fight over the soul of property.” BARBARA H. FRIED, THE 
PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE 163 (2001). 
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phenomenon,55 rulemaking deliberations evince a very limited recognition 
of the ways in which the rules structure bargaining.  Professor Hale’s work 
is of particular interest to our inquiry because of the attention and novel 
insight he provides into the legal conditioning of the bargain in areas 
classically considered to be in the realm of private ordering and beyond 
legal conditioning. 
Second, Professor Hale’s engagement with a significant problem of his 
day, the constitutionality of setting rates for utilities, is instructive because 
it identifies and critiques a particular type of legal reasoning at work in the 
deliberations of procedural rulemakers today.  The value of Professor 
Hale’s rate regulation analysis is not due to strong similarities between the 
rate regulation context and the reform of discovery rules; rather, its utility 
lies in allowing us to recognize the long pedigree of a form of legal analysis 
that clings to an appearance of neutrality and objectivity, the functions it 
tends to serve, and the types of critique to which it may remain susceptible.  
In the rate-making cases, Professor Hale was referencing actors who were 
implicated in, or authors of, a particular historical development who were 
also seeking to erase their participation and deny the coercive power that 
courts would invariably exercise. 
B.  Understanding Coercion 
Professor Hale’s work characterizing coercion as expansive and 
inescapable56 will sound strange to modern sensibilities, as indeed it did to 
many of his contemporaries.  His expansive reading of coercion, that it is 
everywhere and part of every exchange, is integral to his argument.  Indeed, 
he relies precisely on the realization of the truly capacious reach of coercion 
to suggest that its presence or absence cannot be the basis for legal doctrine. 
Professor Hale identifies the market as a system of mutual coercion, 
where the ability to extract a price for one’s goods or services depends on 
the legal right to withhold those goods or services from others.  There is no 
bargaining that is “free” as compared to that which is “coerced.”  Through 
this argument, he seeks to remove “free bargaining” as a criterion by which 
to judge whether further government coercion is desirable.  The key insight 
is twofold.  First, whatever the source of the power, every exchange 
involves coercion; we normally do not see the coercion, however, because it 
 
 55. See generally Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks & Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Law:  A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982). 
 56. See ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW:  PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE 
GOVERNING POWER 3–11, 35–37, 189–96, 366–82 (1952) [hereinafter HALE, FREEDOM 
THROUGH LAW]; Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. 
REV. 603, 606–07 (1943) [hereinafter Hale, Economic Liberty]; Robert L. Hale, Coercion 
and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 470 (1923) 
[hereinafter Hale, Coercion and Distribution] (“[A] careful scrutiny will . . . demonstrate 
that the systems advocated by professed upholders of laissez-faire are in reality permeated 
with coercive restrictions on individual freedom. . . .  Some sort of coercive restriction of 
individuals . . . is absolutely unavoidable, and cannot be made to conform to any Spencerian 
formula.”). See generally Robert L. Hale, Force and the State:  A Comparison of “Political” 
and “Economic” Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (1935). 
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is exercised by what we term a “private” actor.57  Second, Professor Hale 
tackles the source of the power to coerce, demonstrating that the 
government’s role in private coercion cannot be elided.58  Legal rules 
intervene in bargaining relationships that are themselves constructed by 
law.59  The only way to get the full measure of them is to turn to the 
conditions in which the bargain is being struck.60 
It is through the concept of coercion that Professor Hale argues that legal 
rules are not neutral.  Since nearly all incomes are generated through 
(private) coercion, there is no posture the law can inhabit that does not 
involve coercion.  The law allows, amplifies, counterbalances, or flips 
existing coercion so that in every instance the law is choosing among forms 
of coercion.61  We only see this by understanding social relations as 
bargaining and legal framework as intervening (sometimes by doing 
nothing) in those bargaining relations.62 
Bargaining’s significance for procedure operates on two levels.  The 
primary level involves bargaining over the terms of the litigation itself:  
what motions will be filed, what discovery allowed, what settlement talks 
engaged, and how quickly or slowly to proceed.  This bargaining is 
structured in obvious ways by the procedural rules themselves (although 
even this level of bargaining is not sufficiently attended to in rulemaking 
deliberations).  On the secondary level, parties bargain over the controversy 
or relationship that gives rise to the suit.  That is, parties’ bargaining 
positions in the litigation itself is structured by their relative bargaining 
position external to the litigation.  To take two very obvious examples, a 
party’s relative holdout power in settlement will depend in substantial part 
on its relative economic power; this holdout power will play a significant 
role in all manners of procedural bargaining and in the ultimate settlement 
 
 57. Hale, Coercion and Distribution, supra note 56, at 472–79. 
 58. Id. at 477–78; see also HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note 56, at 11 (“These 
economic inequalities are embodied in legal rights which the government enforces.”). 
 59. Hale, Economic Liberty, supra note 56 at, 624–26. 
 60. See, e.g., HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note 56, at 4–5 (“Whether any given 
extension of state control in the economic sphere involves an enlargement or a diminution of 
individual liberty can be determined only after a careful weighing of alternatives.”); Hale, 
Coercion and Distribution, supra note 56, at 479–81. 
 61. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note 56, at 11; Hale, Coercion and 
Distribution, supra note 56, at 479–81. 
 62. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note 56, at 6–11.  While conventional 
economic analysis of litigation centers on the bargaining context and recognizes discovery as 
an instrument that significantly shapes or “distorts” outcomes, the literature tends to operate 
from the premise that there are accurate outcomes with which, if properly calibrated, 
discovery will not interfere. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 401–03 (2004); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under 
Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404, 409, 413–14 (1984); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 445–46 (1988); J. Maria 
Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1715–16 (2012) 
(focusing on the centrality of settlement under the Federal Rules today, and calling for 
reform on that basis and attentive to that phenomenon); Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement of 
Litigation:  A Critical Retrospective, in REFORMING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 13 (Larry 
Kramer ed., 1996) (describing the economic model in detail); Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. 
Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59, 69–72 (1997). 
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made.  Likewise, a party’s control over, and access to, relevant information 
will be critical to its litigation bargaining position. 
If we accept Professor Hale’s argument, neither factor of relative 
economic power or relative information control is a naturally occurring 
phenomenon; both are the results of privately exercised coercion.  
Moreover, that privately exercised coercion is structured by law and could 
be structured a different way if law so desired.63  It seems apparent that 
procedure should recognize the primary level of bargaining and engage 
directly in understanding how the Rules affect relative bargaining position 
with respect to that primary level and, normatively, what effect it ought to 
have.  It is less apparent, but no less relevant, to wonder what attention, if 
any, procedure should pay to the secondary level.64  That level plainly 
influences the effect that procedural rules will have. 
The rate regulation debate implicated the constitutional legitimacy of 
legislative regulation of the market and raised questions as to the nature of 
 
 63. In his classic article, “Against Settlement,” Professor Owen M. Fiss posits that it is 
the judge presiding over his court that can serve as a safeguard and equalizer ensuring that 
relative bargaining power be taken into account. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE 
L.J. 1073, 1076, 1085–90 (1984).  Fiss’s account sketches a landscape in which plaintiffs 
particularly suffer from resource inequalities leading to injuries left undercompensated or 
worse. Id.  Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Robert Klonoff have described how mistaken 
Fiss’s empirical account has turned out to be about the relative bargaining position between 
plaintiffs and defendants, with substantially increased plaintiff bargaining power in the 
decades after Fiss’s article.  Issacharoff explains this as a combination of legal (relaxing the 
restrictions on attorney solicitation) and technological developments (allowing increased 
organization among the plaintiffs’ bar). Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public 
Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1179–83 (2009) (highlighting that litigation 
inequalities are produced, in part, by background legal rules and the complexity of factors 
that condition litigation inequality). 
 64. This is not unprecedented in the procedural system.  Rule 23 could be understood as 
a procedural intervention designed to make functional particular, formal procedural rights.  
And the effective vindication doctrine in the arbitration context, depending on how narrowly 
or broadly it is construed, also might set the margins of the otherwise dominant principle that 
procedure must ignore functional inequality.  For strong articulations of narrow construction 
in the majority opinion and broad construction in Justice Kagan’s dissent, see American 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).  Compare, for example, 
the language of Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion: 
As we have described, the exception finds its origin in the desire to prevent 
“prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies[.]”  That would 
certainly cover a provision in an arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of 
certain statutory rights.  And it would perhaps cover filing and administrative fees 
attached to arbitration that are so high as to make access to the forum 
impracticable.  But the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a 
statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that 
remedy.  The class-action waiver merely limits arbitration to the two contracting 
parties.  It no more eliminates those parties’ right to pursue their statutory remedy 
than did federal law before its adoption of the class action for legal relief in 1938. 
Id. at 2310–11 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted), with Justice Kagan’s dissent: 
Our decisions have developed a mechanism—called the effective-vindication 
rule—to prevent arbitration clauses from choking off a plaintiff’s ability to enforce 
congressionally created rights.  That doctrine bars applying such a clause when 
(but only when) it operates to confer immunity from potentially meritorious 
federal claims. 
Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
2017] IS PROCEDURE POLITICAL? 2219 
property itself.  In the rate-making cases, courts were asked to review the 
reasonableness of government-set rates in railroads and public utilities. 
Railroads, with public utilities following in their wake, challenged 
regulatory rates on grounds that the rate limitations were unreasonable, 
representing an unconstitutional deprivation of property under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
The legal controversy focused on two legal doctrines.  First was the 
doctrine of “horizontal constraints”65 that limited government regulation of 
prices to only those businesses supposedly “affected with a public 
interest.”66  This was plainly understood to include public utilities, but 
scholars were concerned with what else beyond public utilities might be 
included as within the public interest scope.67  The second doctrine 
concerned “vertical constraints.”68  That is, to the extent a business was 
affected with a public interest, the government was allowed to set prices 
only to the point it guaranteed at least a “fair return” on the “fair value.”69  
This second doctrine was a major focus of Professor Hale’s work and has 
greatest relevance for our purposes. 
In Smyth v. Ames,70 the Court held that a rate could be unconstitutional if 
it was set “so unreasonably low as to deprive the carrier of its property 
without such compensation as the Constitution secures, and therefore 
without due process of law.”71  Thus the Court determined that the 
Constitution required that rates be set high enough to allow a “fair return” 
on the “fair value of the property being used by [the company] for the 
convenience of the public.”72 
For nearly fifty years following Smyth, courts subjected rate regulation of 
public utilities and railroads to the fair value rule.  That is, in examining the 
constitutionality of a rate-setting regulation, a court would aim to divine the 
 
 65. See Robert L. Hale, The Constitution and the Price System:  Some Reflections on 
Nebbia v. New York, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 401, 424–25 (1934). 
 66. Id. at 416.  “Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a 
manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large.” Munn v. 
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876) (declining a due process challenge to a statute regulating 
grain elevator storage rates on the basis that they are private property “affected with a public 
interest”). 
 67. Justice David Brewer, dissenting in a case analyzing the “public interest” issue 
explained the danger: 
There is scarcely any property in whose use the public has no interest.  No man 
liveth unto himself alone, and no man’s property is beyond the touch of another’s 
welfare. 
   . . . . 
  . . . If [the government] may regulate the price of one service, which is not a 
public service, or the compensation for the use of one kind of property which is not 
devoted to a public use, why may it not with equal reason regulate the price of all 
service, and the compensation to be paid for the use of all property? 
Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 549, 551 (1892). 
 68. Hale, supra note 65, at 424–25. 
 69. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546–47 (1898). 
 70. 169 U.S. 466 (1898). 
 71. Id. at 526. 
 72. Id. at 546. 
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fair value of a business, ensuring a fair return on the fair value.73  The Court 
in Smyth envisioned that fair value could be determined through scientific 
calculation and set out a multifactor standard that included the original cost 
of constructing the property, the amount expended in permanent 
improvements to the property, the par value and market value of a 
company’s stocks and bonds, and the present cost of replacement of the 
property.74  The Justices thus launched themselves and the nation’s rate 
commissioners on a curious and wasteful search for the objective “value” of 
the property for which rates would be set.  Whatever the number 
commissioners and courts arrived at for fair value, the Smyth standard also 
suggested that there was an objective, “fair” rate of return on that value.75 
Professor Hale and other legal realists (“Realists”) questioned the 
Supreme Court’s search for a factual and scientific measure of public utility 
value.  The value quest, Realists argued, was a way of avoiding directly 
addressing controversies about the nature and purpose of property.76  The 
rate-making decisions were “regularly shrouded in an aura of science,”77 
what Gerard Henderson called “the illusion of juristic necessity.”78  
Professor Henderson’s description of the Supreme Court’s rate-making 
jurisprudence is evocative of common tendencies in our civil procedural 
discourse: 
[T]he court has been trying to ascertain not a rule of policy, but a 
discoverable fact. . . .  [It has been operating with the] conception that 
there is a fact which can be discovered . . . and which, once it is found, 
will provide a mathematical solution of all rate-making problems . . . .79 
The retreat to “science” reflected judicial discomfort in the discretion that 
the cases afforded them.  Judges were forced to engage in policymaking 
that perhaps appeared best suited to legislative decision making.80  
Professor Hale’s and other Realists’ work demonstrated that the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of “value” was circular.  That is, the rules that courts 
would adopt as to rate setting would determine the future value of the 
property.  Thus, the judicial analysis sought to hide policymaking and 
choices about resource distribution through what appeared to be an 
objective analysis. 
Since the market value of income-producing property was equal to the 
anticipated stream of future earnings the property generates, the fair value 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 547.  One commentator describes the result thus:  “[T]ogether they produced 
only a hodgepodge of irreconcilable standards.” FRIED, supra note 54, at 179. 
 75. West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 295 U.S. 662, 671 (1935) (“[W]here 
by legislation prescribing rates or charges the use of the property is taken, just compensation 
assured by these constitutional provisions is a reasonable rate of return upon that value.”). 
 76. HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 162. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Gerard Henderson, Railway Valuation and the Courts (pt. 1), 33 HARV. L. REV. 902, 
912 (1920). 
 79. Id. at 910, 912. 
 80. Of course, one solution to this quandary would have been to acknowledge the gaping 
legal discretion and to defer to legislative will accordingly. 
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would depend upon the rate that regulators set.  Thus, to define a 
constitutional rate as one that allowed a fair return on fair value was to 
engage in an inevitably circular analysis.  Perhaps to avoid this problem, the 
Court fleshed out the contours of “value” with the above-described 
multifactor standard.  Professor Hale charged that the Court’s explanation 
had little to no relationship to the question at hand:  “what the value of the 
entire business ought to be.”81  The word “valuation” was used in different 
and contradictory ways depending on the purpose of the valuation.  Indeed, 
its meaning “depended on the purpose for which the valuation was done.”82 
Everything about the process by which “fair value” was determined—the 
rhetoric of the courts and counsel; Smyth’s list of factors to be 
considered . . . the ritual obeisance commissioners paid to that list in rate 
determinations—conspired to create the illusion that commissions were 
on an evidentiary search for a “fact.”83 
The reasoning functioned to mask the Court’s normative assessment of the 
rate set behind a purportedly objective measure.  Professor Hale explained:  
“[T]he determination of what is a ‘fair value’ is a determination of how 
much confiscation is proper (in the opinion of the court).”84 
Professor Hale took aim at the Supreme Court’s adoption of an eminent 
domain theory of rate regulation,85 which reflected the dominant view that 
understood public utilities and their regulation as a problem of state 
regulation of private ownership.  Formulated as such, rate regulation was a 
confiscatory legislative act.86  In contrast, Professor Hale showed that the 
public utilities’ right to exclude others from using the public utility, in 
itself, generated its value.  As such, it was a legal construct that generated 
the opportunity to charge a rent for use.  It was, in Professor Hale’s terms, a 
private delegation of public power.  The logical import of this conclusion is 
simply that, because unequal bargaining power is a matter generated and 
enforced by the state’s governing legal regimes (in this case, property), it is 
a matter of legislative choice how precisely to set that imbalance. 
Professor Hale leaves open what choice the legislature or the courts can 
make in setting the bargain.  What is demanded is not a particular outcome 
but an abandonment of the pretense that there is some natural, preexisting 
equilibrium that the law can choose to upset or leave alone.  The law is 
never passive; it is always constructing parties’ holdout power.  Professor 
Hale’s analysis suggests that all property is a form of monopoly power 
sanctioned and enabled by the state and that “there is not a single income-
yielding property right, inside or outside the utility field, which can be 
 
 81. Letter from Robert Hale to John B. Winslow, Chief Judge, Wis. Supreme Court 
(Sept. 14, 1918), in FRIED, supra note 54, at 180. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 177. 
 85. Under an eminent domain theory, legislative regulation of rates charged by public 
utilities was analyzed as a governmental taking of property requiring fair compensation of 
the confiscated value. 
 86. HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 161. 
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enjoyed on equal terms by everyone.  To speak of equal rights of property is 
ridiculous.”87  Property picks winners and losers; it determines the strong 
and the weak. 
III.  A HALEAN APPROACH TO DISCOVERY REFORM 
In our procedural work, we can begin by adopting the realist hostility “to 
the substitution of scientific for political discourse,”88 seeking instead to 
ferret out any false claims of objectivity.  Discovery rules are and will be 
policy determinations as to resource distribution.89  Across the spectrum of 
discovery rulemaking (both in the Federal Judicial Conference and in 
doctrinal developments), we should seek the frank acknowledgment of this 
problem and articulation of the policy determinations that are being made. 
Procedural rulemaking is caught in a contradiction.  By definition, it is 
intended only to concern itself with the technical rules of procedure that 
will govern disputes in the civil system.  It constructs, and considers 
modifying, the legal ground rules, what Professor Hale identified as the 
background rules, that structure dispute bargaining.  It is facially prohibited 
from expanding or contracting the substantive rules.  Yet procedure has 
been mired in highly polarized conflict for decades, and the political import 
of these conflicts has been documented explicitly.90  What Professor Hale 
can help us recognize is that the highly visible political conflict generated 
by procedural rules is a feature of procedure rather than a flaw.  Perhaps the 
cure for it is to contend with it much more directly than procedural 
rulemakers—whether administrative, legislative, or judicial—have been 
willing to do thus far. 
What are the lessons we can draw from a close look at this prior example 
of apparently empirical legal reasoning?  Several elements of the reasoning 
articulated in rate-making cases are operating in discovery rulemaking 
today. 
First, in both contexts, legal actors are engaged in a search for 
objectivity.  Professor Hale focused with keen interest on the Supreme 
Court’s commitment in the rate-making cases and cast the legal question as 
one of empirical inquiry:  calculate the value of the property in question and 
calculate the fair rate of return on it.  In discovery deliberations, there has 
been a similar interest in casting questions of discovery as empirical 
problems susceptible to objective determinations.  The 2015 amendments 
were sparked by the inquiry:  Does discovery cost “too much”?  Cost, it was 
hoped, was an objectively measurable variable, and its outcome would 
 
 87. Robert L. Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, 22 COLUM. 
L. REV. 209, 212 (1922). 
 88. HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 162. 
 89. We might say the Committee’s struggle to engage in neutral rulemaking determined 
by empirical data or some other objective determination (or at least to engage in a discourse 
of objectivity) reflects procedure’s peculiar lag or failure to fully incorporate the Realist 
legal consciousness dominant in U.S. law from the New Deal era onward. 
 90. See generally Burbank, Procedure and Power, supra note 5; Galanter, supra note 3; 
Moore, supra note 6; Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse:  
The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683 (1998). 
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reveal what constraints should be placed on discovery.  Ultimately, the 
concept of “proportionality” was deemed the solution.91 
Second, in neither context do we have an inquiry susceptible to scientific 
assessment.  We are not dealing with “fact” but with policy or normative 
judgment.  In the rate regulation context, courts and rate-making 
commissions sought to determine the objective “value” of the property at 
stake.  In discovery today, the objective talismans are proportionality 
specifically and efficiency more broadly. 
Similar to the concept of “value,” to which the Smyth Court assigned a 
multifactor definition without a clear mode of application, so too, the 
proportionality rule ends up in a multifactor test without a clear hierarchy or 
order of operations.  In devising the amendment to Rule 26(b)(1), 
rulemakers grabbed hold of the proportionality concept, conceived of as an 
objective and determinable measure.  Yet commentary from the bar pointed 
to the slipperiness of the concept and its potential normative content.  In 
both contexts, the articulation of a legal rule turns to a seemingly objective 
concept of value or proportionality that is rife with instability and 
subjectivity.  To prevent such instability, judicial actors attempted to 
provide definitional outlines (the multifactor standards), but the concept is 
hopelessly muddled, encompassing several definitions that are not 
reconcilable with one another.92  As a result, the seeming certainty and 
neutrality that the rule seeks results instead in an amorphous analysis that 
appears to turn on the decision makers’ normative judgment.  This 
undifferentiated multifactor analysis can serve to justify any decision. 
Third, Professor Hale’s analysis of coercion was a critique of the view 
that government economic regulation had a distorting effect.  In his 
totalizing view, government passivity was just as constitutive of private 
bargaining as affirmative intervention.  Though the context of procedural 
rules is very different, existing discovery rules still face the claim that they 
have a distorting effect on litigation outcomes (or more specifically, on the 
vast majority of litigation outcomes reached through bargaining).  But this 
claim is subject to the same refutation.  Any set of procedural rules will 
decide winners and losers in the bargaining structured by litigation.  There 
is no “natural” litigation bargain. 
Fourth, rulemakers are wary of wading into questions of policy or 
politics.  This is at least part of the reason that they return time and again to 
seemingly objective concerns such as efficiency, proportionality, and cost.  
Simultaneously, the political problem is also managed by punting the real 
choices to the judges in the courtrooms.  Take again the proportionality 
standard:  not only does it lack clarity and coherence, but it solidifies the 
political questions right into the standard.  What else can it mean for the 
 
 91. Reda, supra note 20, at 1085. 
 92. Gelbach and Kobayashi provide a nonnormative analysis of the proportionality 
standard, identifying objective factors, analyzing the extent that such objective factors are 
measurable, and clarifying where normative factors remain.  In doing so, they point out the 
uncertainty residing at multiple nodes of the proportionality framework. See Gelbach & 
Kobayashi, supra note 47, at 1–3. 
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individual judge to weigh the “importance of the litigation at stake” against 
the expected “costs” of the discovery, as a precondition for determining 
whether anyone is entitled to the discovery?  The standard itself invites 
individual judges to make the political judgments that rulemakers have 
repeatedly declined to make.93  Just as Professor Hale explained that “the 
determination of what is a ‘fair value’ is a determination of how much 
confiscation is proper (in the opinion of the court),”94 so too is the 
determination of proportionality simply delegating to the court the exercise 
of its judgment as to whether the discovery requested is a normative good. 
Fifth, if we follow closely Professor Hale’s insight about the ways in 
which law shapes all of our bargains—through background rules that create 
the inequality or leverage that parties exploit to reach agreements—we may 
be led to wonder about the extent to which procedure grapples with 
inequality today or in the future.  The background rules, procedure among 
them, create the inequality with which litigants arrive in court, and on 
which their relative bargaining power as to a civil settlement depends.  To 
what extent should procedure take this reality into account?95 
The Rules, which govern dispute bargaining in the federal system, 
interact with complex additional background rules addressed by Professor 
Hale and his Realist counterparts.  When the parties appear before the court, 
they arrive with bargaining already delimited by substantive legal 
background rules that will affect their ability to instrumentalize the 
procedural background rules to their desired effect.  The first difficult 
question this poses is a classic Realist one.  The procedural system, 
particularly as a transsubstantive one, seeks to expand formally equal rights, 
but of course parties do not arrive at the court that way. 
Even apart from inequalities created by substantive law governing the 
particular dispute, our legal frameworks create and enable party asymmetry 
in numerous ways.  For instance, there are laws that enable one party to 
have a monopoly of the information that ultimately becomes relevant to a 
dispute.  For example, we allow big businesses to keep data related to their 
employees secret.  This is an express result of our legal regime.  Indeed, the 
fact that enterprises become as large as they do is another express result of 
the legal order.  Since law structures all of this asymmetry, does procedure 
have an obligation to identify and acknowledge it and determine whether its 
rules should amplify or counterbalance that asymmetry? 
 
 93. While this might resemble the perfectly typical delegation of a common law system 
(granting discretion to judges to flesh out the details of a legal standard over time), the 
delegation in the discovery context is bound to remain ad hoc and inconsistent, as these 
decisions are unlikely to be appealed with any regularity. 
 94. FRIED, supra note 54, at 177. 
 95. We might say that the new proportionality standard is doing this already in a partial 
and unsystematic way by identifying information asymmetry as one of the factors relevant to 
the evaluation.  In doing so, it recognizes the inequality of the parties who come before the 
court.  Another place in which we do so already may be in the pro se context (although there 
is, of course, substantial criticism of the treatment of pro se litigants within the system).  
This may be an increasingly important question, as pro se litigants make up a significant 
percentage of the docket. 
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Legal rules are “rules of the game of economic struggle.”96  Whereas 
Professor Hale explained that this was true for the rules of property, 
contract, and tort law, it is perhaps time to recognize that the Rules of Civil 
Procedure play a similar role.  In this capacity “they differentially and 
asymmetrically empower groups bargaining over the fruits of cooperation 
in production.”97 
 
 96. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 327, 327 (1991). 
 97. Id.  Relevant to any discussion here, to focus for a time on the distributional effects 
of legal rules is not to suggest that this is law’s exclusive role: 
The focus of this article doesn’t mean that I think the only important thing about 
law is its distributive effect.  Legal rules function to distribute, but they also 
“resolve disputes” in ways that people find more or less fair . . . .  Legal discourse 
is the language for stating the legal rules that function distributively, but it has 
many other uses and effects (this is where ideas like legitimation, rationalization, 
apology and utopia come in). 
Id. at 327–28. 
